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Abstract: Numerous studies address the issue of tax reforms and their relationship to social inequality. 
However, the results are ambiguous or contradictory. Therefore, this article aims to bring more light to 
this issue by analyzing theoretically and practically, econometrically, the link between the subjects 
analyzed: fiscal reforms, automatic stabilization and social inequality in EU with 28 countries. In 
addition, the idea of tax reform has been simplified by analyzing the evolution of personal income tax 
rates in EU-28 countries, with only those with a higher progressivity to surprise the idea of automatic 
stabilization. However, the outcomes for selected countries from EU-28, although modest in terms of 
linkage intensity, confirm the starting hypothesis: increasing progressivity may support reducing social 
inequality and boosting economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
When politicians and the media launch the idea of fiscal reform, the population, 
companies and even public institutions are suspicious about their possible positive 
effects. Part of the tax reforms are aimed at better balancing the public budget and 
implicitly reducing budget deficits. Noteworthy, lower government deficits reduce 
interest rates in the face of the possibility of not materializing the risk that the 
government may incur tax increases and taxes in the future, so it can provide 
predictability. Moreover, in the case of countries with major fiscal imbalances, in 
order to reduce the risk premium for interest rates in the economy and to restore 
liquidity and the solvency of the public budget, tax adjustments and reforms are 
considered indispensable. They are perceived as fiscal stabilization reforms in order 
to mitigate the macroeconomic instability generated by rising inflation, increased 
interest rates and undesirable effects of trade imbalances as well as the accumulation 
of public debt. For example, in the 1980s, the implementation of fiscal reforms that 
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drastically reduced government spending in Ireland (1987-1989) and Denmark 
(1984-1986) led to a reduction in private consumption to a lesser extent than 
expected. Thus, businessmen have also acted to boost the economy by rebuilding 
and upgrading production units, featuring this kind of tax reform as a government 
commitment to lower taxes and duties in the future. Other successful episodes of 
fiscal reforms aimed at consolidating public finances (e.g. Belgium - 1987, Sweden 
- 1987, Norway - 1986, United States - 1977, Australia - 1987, 1988, New Zealand 
- 1992, Japan - 1987) also indicates the need that the amplitude of the fiscal 
consolidation reform to be high (over 4% of GDP) (McDermott & Wescott, 1997). 
Another example, in the Netherlands, a cut in spending (of 15% of GDP) over the 
period 1982-2000 has created a fiscal space for reduced taxes and has stimulated job 
creation and private sector investment, avoiding an unfavourable effect on income 
inequality (IMF, 2015). 
At the same time, revenue-side reforms have lower chances of success (except for 
emerging and low-income countries, according to Akitoby, 2015) than those 
targeting the expenditure side (e.g. a reduction in budget expenditures - namely of 
the primary structural deficit - up to about 4% of GDP over two years can lead to a 
50% success of the consolidation reform) (McDermott & Wescott, 1997). 
Concerning compromise or trade –off between equity/equality and efficiency, we can 
see that things are not quite straightforward when switching from direct taxation to 
indirect taxation (which aims at promoting economic growth and reducing 
distortions); process associated usually with the increase of social inequality and the 
reduction of fiscal system progressivity. 
Therefore, the article aims to address the issue of tax reforms through its relationship 
with social inequality. In the context of reforms, it will be of interest to promote non-
discretionary character reforms, so that will outline the use of automatic stabilizers. 
 
2. Description of the Problem in the Context of Literature Overview 
Tax reforms can pose serious shocks to the economy, especially if social equity is 
aggravated by the reduction in social transfers, of which the initial purpose was to 
boost labour participation. For example, tax reforms in the 1980s are thought to have 
created a wider dispersion of wages and greater social inequality. Between 1980 and 
2000, Caminada, Goudswaard and Wang (2012) noted that income inequality 
increased, being only partly offset by complementary measures to increase 
redistribution. At the same time, Ball and others (2013) note that inequalities are 
often generated by fiscal consolidation measures, especially when they are based on 
spending. 
Reducing inequality can include providing well-targeted budget transfers, health 
services and education in less-favoured areas (areas with poor industrial networks, 
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rural areas, etc.), increased spending on education and health (Martinez-Vazquez, 
Moreno-Dodson & Vulovic, 2012), provision of technical training for better labour 
mobility from non-productive activities to higher value-added activities (Akitoby, 
2015). 
However, Acosta-Ormaechea, Komatsuzaki and Correa-Caro (2017) state that, 
analyzing nine tax reform episodes in seven high-income countries and using the 
synthetic control method for the 1975-2010 period, less developed countries 
following fiscal reforms experienced higher levels of economic growth, and reforms 
have not generated major changes in aggregate societal inequalities. Moreover, in 
cases where the reform periods coincided with the increase in income inequality, 
there was insufficient evidence to indicate a causal link between a more uneven 
distribution of income and tax reforms. Because of the multitude of studies often 
with contradictory results, the present study aims to address the issue of fiscal 
reforms and adjustments (implicitly non-discretionary) from the perspective of 
connection with social inequality. 
 
3. Methodology and Data Sources 
In the context in which tax reforms target the progressive taxation, the latter is 
associated with the reduction of social inequalities (when it does not generate greater 
tax evasion and inappropriate use of incomes). This is all the more relevant if we 
consider that taxation is used to support government spending on social security and 
social transfers. At the same time, it is interesting to analyze the extent to which a 
single tax rate (now on named flat tax rate) leads or not to increase social inequality, 
acting, according to de facto theory, sometimes as a regressive tax. In addition, it is 
of interest to analyze the extent to which income inequality responds to fluctuations 
in the economic cycle, knowing that aggregate demand and implicitly economic 
growth is higher when income inequality is reduced and vice versa. To quantify the 
income inequality, we used the Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income - 
EU-SILC survey according to Eurostat methodology and data.  
From the theoretical point of view, in order to better connect tax reforms with the 
automatic stabilization mechanism, but also with the issue of social equity, 
simplifying Dinga and al. results (2011, p. 119, fig. 36), we can say that automatic 
stabilizers aim in particular at a progressive tax regime, that is to say, greater social 
equity achieved through taxation. At the same time, the fiscal reforms with an 
automatic nature in addition to progressivity imply a regime of stimulating the 
economy and a good capillarity, both of the bases and of the rates of taxation. 
Therefore, the article will look at the extent to which these elements are present at 
the level of EU countries (e.g. progressivity or single quota/flat tax rate, number of 
thresholds or brackets number, Total general government revenue % GDP, Total 
general government expenditure % GDP, Top statutory personal income tax rates 
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(including surcharges) and Top statutory corporate income tax rates, including 
surcharges) and the extent to which they can connect to the issue of social inequality 
(the Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income - EU-SILC survey). 
Econometric processing, using panel data, will use Eurostat statistics as well as 
statistics from the European Commission and other international bodies. 
 
4. Results Obtained 
According to economic theory, fiscal reforms can affect economic growth through 
four main transmission channels: labour supply, total factor productivity, investment 
in human and physical capital (IMF, 2015). 
With regard to labour supply, the tax system (e.g. by reducing labour tax rates) and 
social transfers can substantially influence decisions on labour market participation 
and working time, especially for specific groups such as workers elderly and women 
(OECD, 2011) and may stimulate or inhibit long-term economic growth. At the same 
time, through reforms with provisions on tax cuts, the youth unemployment issue 
can be interfered, an indicator that is extremely high in Europe after the crisis 
(Banerji et al., 2014). 
In this regard, a possible link between tax reforms, which are transmitted via the 
labour supply channel and automated stabilizers, is unemployment aid. It, designed 
in an effective tax reform, can protect the income of people struck by structural or 
transitional unemployment. However, when they return to work, it can work as a tax 
on labour income, creating obstacles to work. Unemployment benefits play an 
essential role in advanced economies through programs designed to protect people 
from loss of income due to unemployment. However, these programs, if not well 
designed, can adversely affect incentives and employment outcomes (Meyer, 2002; 
Abbring et al., 2005; OECD, 2006). 
In advanced economies, calling for social benefits, with clear eligibility criteria and 
conditional on participation in active labour market integration programs are 
effective tools designed in the framework of tax and labour market reforms. For 
example, in the Netherlands, before the mid-1980s, almost one fifth of the working-
age population benefited from unemployment and disability benefits, increasing 
access to labour market participation (Watson et al., 1999), and in Germany 
widespread reform to improve job search efficiency and encourage labour demand 
led to an increase in the labour force participation rate at 74% from 66% over the 
period 2000-2013, as well as a reduction in the unemployment rate at 5.2% in 2013 
(OECD, 2014). 
It should be noted that there are major differences between advanced economies and 
emerging economies in the sense that if in advanced economies the labour tax is 
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negatively correlated with employment; in the developing economies the link is less 
obvious, on the background of narrower base revenue and a more limited social 
protection network (IMF, 2014). 
From the perspective of total factor productivity, tax reforms can target direct and 
indirect measures to increase R & D expenditure in the public sector and provide tax 
incentives to encourage private R & D spending. Also, public spending on building 
and strengthening the transport infrastructure and offering high quality public 
services can have an immediate effect on the productivity of the private sector and 
lead to technological progress. At the same time, public investment in a high-
performance education system can help improve the absorption of innovative 
technologies at the level of companies and increase the capacity to integrate young 
people into the labour market. Thus, public investment can help increase overall 
factor productivity and ensure long-term economic growth. 
At the same time, tax reforms regarding capital taxes can influence the investment 
or savings decisions. At company level, corporate tax may reduce return on 
investment projects. In this respect, in the model proposed by Devereux and Love 
(1994) it is argue that the cuts in capital tax rates encourage investment and support 
long-term economic growth. 
If we refer to the human capital, recognized in literature (Barro, 2001) as a driver of 
long-term economic growth through participation in production activities and the 
promotion of technical progress, tax reforms can contribute by investing in education 
and health to the accumulation of human capital. For example, some studies (e.g., 
Pecorino, 1993) show that reductions in income tax rates can contribute to increasing 
human capital stock and contribute to long-term economic growth. 
Therefore, the role of fiscal policies is to achieve as much as possible economic 
priorities: ensuring the best possible tax compliance, stimulating employment, 
facilitating the investment phenomenon, and reducing social inequalities. The link 
between these priorities is extremely tight. 
Fairness and fair competition in the business environment is related to the 
elimination to the greatest possible extent of discrepancies, irregularities and abuses, 
while encouraging better tax compliance. Fiscal compliance allows for the provision 
of public funds to reduce social inequalities and to ensure the growth of jobs, as well 
as the funding of social conversion and mobility programs. Reducing social 
inequalities and increasing the number of jobs and possibly the quality of the 
workforce can provide a healthier basis for business support and boosting 
investment. At the same time, supporting investment can help increase employment 
and reduce social inequalities and poverty. In this sense, through the proposed 
objectives, tax reforms and related reforms can conjugate as appropriate as possible 
to these economic and social priorities and can increase the effectiveness of their 
achievement. 
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Thus, in the context of analyzing the link between automatic stabilizers and tax 
reforms, according to EY (2018), a series of elements of recent tax reforms aim at 
greater transparency, a better harmonization of differences between countries' tax 
systems and an and an increasingly internationally combined policy in order to 
combat tax evasion, but also to harmonize tax systems. 
With regard to personal income tax in OECD countries, the “Tax Policy Reforms 
2018: OECD and Selected Partner Economies” (OECD, 2018) highlights the trend 
towards implementing reforms aimed at reducing labour income tax rates, possibly 
leading to the reduction of tax revenues on short-term to reduce.  
In order to improve labour market participation, these reforms aim at increasing the 
progressiveness of personal income tax rate at the same time as shaping the trend of 
increasing personal income tax revenues and extending tax exemptions for certain 
financial incomes. Thus, in 2018, according to this report, the most significant 
reforms in the EU were implemented by Latvia, which introduced a progressive 
regime on personal income tax and France, which introduced a new single tax on 
personal capital gains. Compared with previous years, in 2018, in OECD countries, 
the reduction in corporate tax rates has accelerated, amid a reduction in the rates of 
some countries that traditionally had high rates of corporate income tax, generally at 
the same time as measures to extend corporate tax bases. Although they have 
increased investment incentives, measures on R & D tax incentives have remained 
limited (OECD, 2018). 
If we strictly refer to Europe, in the European Commission's 2018 report “Taxation 
Trends in the European Union, Data for the EU Member States, Iceland and Norway” 
at the beginning of 2018, the maximum personal income tax rate was 39% for EU28, 
with no significant change since 2013, while the average personal income tax rate 
rose slightly in 2018 for the euro area to 42.6%. As the OECD report mentioned 
above, Latvia and France have increased their maximum rates of personal income 
tax, while countries such as Portugal, Romania and Finland have lowered their rates. 
Thus, asymmetries in personal income tax rates remain considerable in the EU28, 
ranging from a minimum of 10% in Bulgaria to over 55% in Denmark and Sweden. 
Turning to a qualitative and quantitative approach, if we analyze at the level of the 
countries of the European Union the fulfilment of criteria that reflect on the one hand 
the idea of fiscal reform and on the other hand the automatic stabilization (which 
implies progressive and capillary rate) we can see (see Table 1) that, out of the many 
EU28 countries, only 13 of them meet the required criteria at the same time. 
Thus, although tax adjustments occurred in all member countries, for the idea of tax 
reform we only considered the change in the higher personal income tax rate for the 
considered analysis period (2007-2017) according to the European Commission’s 
2018 report, “Taxation Trends in the European Union, Data for the EU Member 
States, Iceland and Norway”. Thus, we excluded from the calculation countries such 
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as Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria and Romania. 
Table 1. The classification of the countries of the European Union with 28 countries 
according to the criteria: reform, progressivity and capillarity according to the higher 
rate of the personal income tax rate for the period 2007-2017 
Country 
Code 
Reforms considered taking 
into account the change in 
the top rate of personal 
income tax for the period 
2007-2017, Yes (1) / No (0) 
Progressive 
tax rates (1) or 
flat tax rate 
(0) 
Capillarity 
Yes (1) / No (0). We 
considered "Yes" if 
there are ≥ 3 
thresholds/brackets 
Number 
of 
brackets  
BE 1 1 1 5 
BG 1 0 0 0 
CZ 1 0 0 0 
DK 1 1 0 2 
DE 0 1 1 4 
EE 1 0 0 0 
IE 1 1 0 2 
EL 1 1 1 4 
ES 1 1 1 5 
FR 1 1 1 5 
HR 1 1 1 3 
IT 1 1 1 5 
CY 1 1 1 5 
LV 1 0 0 0 
LT 1 0 0 0 
LU 1 1 1 8 
HU 1 0 0 0 
MT 0 1 1 5 
NL 0 1 1 4 
AT 0 1 1 7 
PL 1 1 0 2 
PT 1 1 1 5 
RO 0 0 0 0 
SL 1 1 1 5 
SK 1 1 0 2 
FI 1 1 1 5 
SE 1 1 1 4 
UK 1 1 1 4 
Source: European Commission (2018) and Eurostat data. Author’s conception and processing 
Notes: BE - Belgium, BG - Bulgaria, CZ - Czech Republic, DK - Denmark, DE - Germany, EE - 
Estonia, IE - Ireland, EL - Greece, ES - Spain, FR - CY - Cyprus, LV - Latvia, LT - Lithuania, LU - 
Luxembourg, HU - Hungary, MT - Malta, NL - Netherlands, AT - Austria, PL - Slovakia, FI - Finland, 
SE - Sweden, UK - United Kingdom. 
At the same time, to take into account only those reforms based on the tax system 
progressivity, for personal income tax, we exclude all countries with a flat tax rate: 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary. Romania, 
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during the analysis period, had a flat tax rate but was already excluded from the 
previous criterion of the fiscal reform, considering in this study that the fiscal 
adjustments were of a small scale and did not fit into the concept of reform. 
In order to better capture the part of automatic stabilization, we also excluded those 
countries that, although having progressive rates of personal tax, have a small 
number of tax thresholds or brackets (under 3). By this criterion we have given up 
Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Slovakia. Thus, the remaining 13 countries 
simultaneously meet the three criteria for reform, progressivity and capillarity of 
personal income tax rates. At the same time, for the period 2007-2017, if we also 
take into account the change or not of the higher corporate income tax, according to 
the same report of the European Commission, we have to exclude from the analysis 
countries such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, Austria, Poland and Romania. 
Except, Belgium, these are already found in the exclusions made to the criterion on 
the higher rate of personal income tax. Therefore, we will only analyze 12 countries 
to see the connectivity between income inequality, the concept of tax reform and 
automatic stabilization. These countries are Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
Thus, for the period 2007-2017, using a correlation matrix between the economic 
growth rate, the Gini coefficient, used in the literature to capture social inequality, 
the number of personal income tax thresholds, Top statutory personal income tax 
rates and respectively Top statutory corporate income tax rates and Total general 
government revenue % GDP and Total general government expenditures % GDP for 
Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Finland, Sweden and the UK, we can draw a series of empirically relevant 
conclusions on the link between the gradual increase in personal income tax rates, 
social inequality and economic growth. We recall that according to Eurostat, the Gini 
coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the population 
(arranged according to the level of equalized disposable income) to the cumulative 
share of the equalized total disposable income received by them. Theoretically, the 
relationship between the elements analyzed should be in the idea that increasing 
progressiveness can lead to a decrease in social inequality and an increase in the rate 
of economic growth. The correlation matrix cannot identify the causality, but only 
the existence of the link by revealing its strength and the meaning/sign of the link 
(see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix between real GDP growth rate, Gini coefficient, personal 
income tax rate brackets number, top statutory personal income tax rates, top 
statutory corporate income tax rates as well as total general government revenues and 
expenditures (%GDP) for Greece, Spain, France , Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom for 2007-
2017 
  
RGDPG
R (%) 
Gini 
coef 
BN TSPITR 
(%) 
TSCITR 
(%) 
TGGR 
(%GDP) 
TGGE 
(%GDP) 
RGDPGR 
(%) 1       
Gini coef -0.202 1      
BN 0.158 
-
0.146 1     
TSPITR (%) -0.004 
-
0.140 -0.315 1    
TSCITR (%) -0.036 0.237 0.238 0.345 1   
TGGR 
(%GDP) 0.035 
-
0.488 -0.005 0.562 0.317 1  
TGGE 
(%GDP) -0.362 
-
0.179 -0.248 0.521 0.365 0.731 1 
Source: European Commission (2018) and Eurostat data. Author’s conception and processing 
Notes: RGDPGR (%) - real GDP growth rate, Gini coef - Gini coefficient of equalized disposable 
income - EU-SILC survey, BN - number of personal income tax rate brackets, TSPITR – top statutory 
personal income tax rate, TSCITR – top statutory corporate income tax rate (% of GDP), TGGE (% 
GDP) - total general government revenue (% of GDP), TGGE (% GDP) – total general government 
expenditures (% of GDP). 
It can be seen that although there are negative correlations at least in the first columns 
of the table, the bonds are generally extremely weak without requiring a development 
of the analysis by regression equations. A higher Gini coefficient signifies the 
increase in social inequality, so its negative connection with the economic growth 
rate supports the theory and the starting hypothesis. The same can be said of the fact 
that the number of thresholds is positively correlated, albeit extremely weak, with 
the economic growth rate. It is also supportive of the theory that higher income and 
profit tax rates (TSPITR and TSCITR) are negatively correlated with economic 
growth, suggesting that reforms should always aim at adjusting higher rates of 
taxation. At the same time, the significance of the negative correlation between the 
higher rates of personal income tax and profit versus the Gini coefficient might 
suggest that their growth would reduce social inequalities, considering that the tax 
systems analyzed are progressive. Equally, it should be noted that both general 
government expenditure and revenue are negatively correlated with the Gini 
coefficient, suggesting that it contributes significantly to reducing social inequalities. 
This is more evident in the case of revenue, suggesting that the increase in the 
progressivity of tax rates contributes to reducing social inequalities. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the context of contemporary economic imbalances, reforms in general and tax 
reforms in particular play an important role in bringing the world's economies to 
normal. Often viewed as having a negative social impact, tax reforms can be 
designed to increase the progressiveness of tax rates. Increasing the progressivity of 
tax rates is considered both theoretically and in practice as having a beneficial impact 
on reducing social inequalities. Thus, this study addresses the link between tax 
reforms, social inequalities and automatic stabilizers. 
Using data from the European Commission (European Commission, 2018) and 
Eurostat for the EU28 for the period 2007-2017 and based on a series of hypotheses 
and simplifications, we selected data for 12 countries (Greece, Spain, France, 
Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom) with a high rate of progressive tax. With 132 statistical 
observations using panel data, the results can be considered as credible as possible. 
In theory, the increase in progressivity should be correlated negatively with social 
inequality and positive with the rate of economic growth. The matrix of correlation 
between selected elements, though extremely weak, reflects and confirms these 
correlations. Therefore, the results of the study confirm once again the theoretical 
statements that the increase in the progressive rate of personal income tax rates 
contributes to the reduction of social inequalities. 
 
6. Future Directions to Be Approached 
Where there is sufficient information, the same type of analysis could be extended 
to the tax base. In addition, since countries such as Germany, Malta, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Austria have highly progressive personal income tax rates with a 
high degree of granularity or capillarity, other authors resuming the analysis on other 
periods and, after other systematization, may have reintroduce them in their 
attention. At the same time, to see if the flat tax rate has a regressive effect, which 
could theoretically increase social inequalities, it would be interesting to analyze all 
the EU-28 countries that have a flat tax rates: Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary. Equally, countries such as Denmark, 
Ireland, Slovakia and Poland, considered in this study as having personal income tax 
rates with low capillary, could be reintroduced into an analysis that better captures 
the valences of reduced versus high capillarity. 
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